

I Mil. C-E objectives

4.c To develop & maintain C + C, and communication systems which are continuously ^(either) generous & survivable

C-E system must be reliable, secure, and survivable

Guiding Principles

System & facilities must be responsive to the C-E segments of originating in the chain of military command [national] that are associated with the rapid, selective, flexible, and enduring control of military forces.

6. C-E design, planning, engineering & construction efforts will be based on a full consideration of possible political, military and national influences of a destructive or disruptive nature and feasible enemy exploitation of electromagnetic activities of friendly forces.

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LWCG, SENSORS; SECURITY; COMM WEP
PVC 1871

9. C + E systems must be provided which will ensure continuity of operations and facilitate succession of command for those command elements and communications facilities that are estimated to be being targets in a limited or general war.

[CP's?]

random operation techniques [?] [?]

15. Plans must provide for survivable command systems which will provide minimum essential channels for C + C.

CW

14. Maximum advantage will be taken of new techniques affording survivability of communications through hardening, mobility, concealment, dispersal, alternate routing and multiple means to ensure maintenance of capability to control the military.

power of the US

responsibly to US [?]

political and military liaison. [?]

o To assist in developing a climate of
opinion abroad which will permit the US
to utilize its military forces where and when
required.

Task II: Short or execution of controlled; deliberate attacks

11. Nuclear Reserve. The retention of, or the capability to reconstitute quickly, a reserve is an indispensable requirement for all types of warfare and is particularly significant in general war. [1]

With current capabilities, the requirement for a nuclear reserve can be fulfilled to a degree by:

a. Nuclear capable forces not presently committed to initial strikes: e.g. those aircraft carriers, SAC command support [?] and training units which are not committed to the SIOP or initial command over those

b. Continued improvements in planning for use of surviving forces in follow-on and "on-call" roles against targets, or reprints

c. Recognizing that substantial units of forces committed to the initial attacks will survive and be available for subsequent strikes and can be considered as an integral element of the regional reserve.

S1OP: Provide for optimum introduction of committed forces of the CINCS and for coordination with other external commands, for all precision attacks on selected targets. DGZ's x weight of effort.

(c) Any conflicts which arise in force programming of S1OP forces for the various attack choices will be resolved in favor of optimization for Attack Option T. [P]

VIS compatibility Performance guidance for S1OP

Please synchronize separately the VTS & S1OP, if necessary.

JSCP

30. One recognized that present, or that, across the board, capabilities are marginal to support sustained major non-nuclear operations.

Continuing efforts will focus on enhancing logistics capabilities to conduct sustained non-nuclear operations.

GW Ops

36. Should an invading the ocean, the US will:

1) React swiftly & effectively to repel the aggression.

2) Be prepared to shift & expand the area of conflict in such a way so that US & allied strengths can be more effectively applied. [?]

3) Exploit opportunities to liberate peoples

territories formerly lost through aggression. [?]

4) Fight in concert with allies & neutrals if necessary

5) Limit damage with the use of conflict, consistent with the achievement of non-lethal objectives.

17. Plans for employment of non-SOP forces, to the extent possible, will be based upon the same degree of responsive alerting as applicable to SOP forces, be related to the attack options of the ^{will} SOP, & be complementary to SOP mission.

... ops by GIV... may take the form of defensive [I? II?] ops for an extensive period of time, followed by offensive ops, or early offensive ops in the event of a pre-emptive strike. Planning, & for GIV planning purposes, ops could fall into one of two broad categories: i. defensive ops in the event of initiation of GIV combat conditions of hostile warning only [I? II?] or offensive ops at an early time in the event of pre-emptive strikes in accordance with attack options I + II.

F.D.R.

Prepare plan to assist any revolutionary outbreak that may occur in Albania, Bulgaria, Czech, East Germany, Hungary.

Planning should provide for the following military action:

- 1) Logistic support.
- 2) Deployment of Special Forces ab. with resolution force.
- 3) Psychological
- 4) Direct military intervention by military forces.

Takes into account two situations where US forces are not directly engaged, although they are

surrounds of Albania.

Plan action to

manage their request to intervene in Poland.

12. Controls flexibility of response

5. Below are listed currently available courses of action,
the implementation of which will provide a greater
degree of control. It has been recognized that these proposed
courses of action could be significantly affected by the
precision and completeness of our information on
enemy strengths. Accordingly, commanders will include
in their plans a concise statement of the risks
involved in their implementation. These courses of action,
designed to minimize destruction not directly
associated with a specific attack vehicle:

- 1) Withholding all strikes on certain countries.
- 2) Attacking a restricted category of targets in certain
countries, i.e. neutralization of air defenses.
- 3) Combination of delivery systems used on targets in
attack, i.e. mixed aircraft against Target
regarding passive delivery mechanisms on targets
in vicinity of target.

19c. Members of CINCPAC, including NO-63, will ensure

that all aspects of current flexibility and

selectivity are clearly & specifically identified

in plans and provided for a planned execution

* Orders and messages

GW Obs

24. Ops will consist of a combination of nuclear, non-nuclear action with the initial emphasis on employment of nuclear weapons to accomplish the stated objective.

The governing principle in the employment of nuclear weapons

therefore is that, the US must emerge from initial nuclear

ops with a clear military advantage. This advantage

may well include the prompt survival, in certain

areas of the Far East [?], of known dissident peoples who

can disrupt, on a continuing basis, the enemy's war

efforts. Ops carried by initial nuclear operations will be

expected. Opposing defenses are to utilize the strategy

advantage gained by the nuclear ops and to bring the war

a successful conclusion for the US.

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6.1

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Humanitarian Assistance

See also: Humanitarian Assistance

Contributed At: VENICE, 5.5.63

No. 21
Retention of the US

2) Members. The availability of US members for military ops would be substantially reduced by the resultant casualties and need for emergency civil defense recovery operations.

An estimated 10-20 million persons may be required

to perform emergency rehabilitation work. However, such personnel would have priority over military

operations and their support. It is possible that as many as 42,000,000 persons may be killed and

12,000,000 injured. If so, restrictions would be imposed

on the combat strength of the Armed forces and medical and physical standards for acceptance into the

Armed forces would probably be reduced. Strength,

morale, continuity of instruction, the civilian economy, the

maximum combat estimate would be imposed. The training

of US diplomatic and military personnel

Korea:

Intelligence

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Relating small intell. analysis of threat...

to NVA's strength by surveying strengths of 1961
interv. what could be brought to bear: 55 divisions

in Central Front. But now: start. drop to 50
^(15 withdrawn)

Tactical air strength

Chief obstacle to conventional buildup of
NVA is still industrial expansion. Feeling

that 50 conventional bombing is too great to cope
with, even definitely. (NATO estimates may contribute)
by excavating tanks).

We have good intell. on 50 fixed missile sites
(inc. short-range; smaller quantity than NVA).

Rate don't cover any mobile est. on shorter range.

mobile missiles [mobile so they can be kept in SU
until needed].

In contrast to 1961 est., 56 more projects

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Our short trip in to tactical air strength through

aircraft, not an individual, in ^{on way of} front

our national capability to maintain the projected mobilization schedule would be severely impaired. It is estimated that a major limiting factor on our capability to recover from a nuclear attack would be the absence of effective manpower.

Production facilities would suffer severe damage. (1) Production base in military production would be at initially low levels for the first several months after the nuclear exchange. The primary efforts will be directed toward producing relatively simple parts and components essential to survival and continuing combat operations.

2. Allied Forces Facilities. No attempt has been made to estimate the effects of nuclear attack against our Allied military forces would receive the same degree of damage as comparable US forces in the same area. An attack on our allied forces would limit the further course of the offensive, and

would be directed against the US, especially on the West Coast.

and have both a "deterrent and a win-winning capability."

Caners take hours or days to get in position, whereas the requirement is for immediate attacks at the time to minimize damage to the US. Forces which are not in French position would appear to make a questionable contribution in initial and decisive operations.

[COERCION]

USOT provides info to commands and planning guidance to services.

Program guidance objective force levels considered necessary to support US military strategy.

Military engagement in [NATO] area contains the inherent risk of action and counteraction quickly involving general war.

General war cannot be excluded as the outcome of a local crisis in which both sides become progressively committed or in which a miscalculation by either side occurred. [Would objectives of US or SO be the same in this case as in a "deliberate, cold-blooded attack?"] They must, once the Soviets decide on general war, they will themselves seek to initiate it by surprise nuclear attack on the US. [DEF. of General War?]

They must design their initial attack so as to eliminate or reduce to acceptable proportions the modern retaliation which could be launched by Western forces and so as to emerge with military superiority with which to pursue their objectives of world domination.

[US objectives: guarantee to perpetuate its hegemony]

CNO: [Russian satellite forces]
CNO: boomer effect of overextending deterrence into field of limited aggression will shrink.

AF: Must be able to destroy delivery sys., control mechanisms and supporting resources... strategic advantage... must have both a "deterrent and a win-winning capability." Carries tele hours or days to get in position, whereas "the requirement is for immediate attacks at H-hour to minimize damage to the US. Forces which are not in launch position would offer to make a questionable contribution in initial ad decisive operations."

[CORRECTION]

NSOP provides info to commands and planning guidance to services.

Program guidance... objective force levels considered necessary to support US military strategy.

Military engagement in [NSOP] area contains the inherent risk of action and counteraction quickly involving general war. General war cannot be excluded as the outcome of a local crisis in which both sides become progressively committed or in which a miscalculation by either side occurred. [Would objective of US or SO be the same in this case as in a "deliberate, cold-blooded attack?"] They may want, once the Soviets decide on general war, they will themselves seek to initiate it by surprise nuclear attack on the US. [DEF. of General War?] They must design their initial attack so as to eliminate or

DEF. OF
GW?

clearly prepared to win either general or limited war."

... to convince nations & peoples of the world that US military capability & will to use its armed forces in whatever form is necessary to make the use of force by the Com Bloc an unacceptable course of action.

LW: To deal swiftly and effectively with any limited war in a manner and on a scale best calculated to bring the Com Bloc to a conclusion satisfactory to the US and, consistent with the foregoing, to prevent the hostilities from broadening into general war. ^{big nuclear}

X
X
X
X

BW: The military objective of the US for war [NOT DEFINED] is to defeat the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This includes:

- a) Reducing by military action the capabilities of the USSR and Communist China to the point where they have lost their will and ability [possible?] to continue the war [BNSP: to wage war] against the US and its allies.
- b) Providing for the defense of the US and other vital areas.

[Is BNSP?]

- c) Preserving and retaining as many of its effective allies as possible.
- d) Achieving a sound peace relationship with other nations sufficient to serve as a free nation and pursue US national objectives. [WHICH ARE?]

[Don't fail to look at consequences of strategy for fear of "weakening resolve," "loosing objectives"; must look at consequences to others, etc.]

[offer reasonable hope of achieving objectives such as preventing, limiting damage, etc., when other strategies offer no such hope. Note that, just as US security is not the negative of SO security, US ability to prevail is not just the ability to prevent the SO from prevailing; concentration on last objectives is not the best path to achieving the first. Many strategies might result in neither sides' prevailing, not because of "stalemate" but because of neither surrender.]

Appropriate nuclear delivery forces will be designed to attack an optimum-mix target system (the NSC) as an [immediately] ^[too soon to force] essential national task to be accomplished under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated. Specific objectives are:

- 1) Destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear delivery capability and primary military and governmental controls of major importance.
- 2) Attack the major urban-industrial centers of the S-S Bloc to achieve the general level of destruction indicated in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy.

Register Annex C: It is possible that as many as 93,479 may be killed and an additional 12,191 injured. If so, some restriction may be imposed on the peak strength of the armed forces during later operations without reducing mental and physical standards for acceptance into the armed forces.

... a major factor limiting our ability to surrender surrender from an invasion attack would be the likelihood of a still more effective invasion.

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During a period of relative calm. The onset of a GW ~~will~~ probably will be characterized by an intense exchange of nuclear blows and the initiation of further operations and deployment by Army, Naval & Air Forces. The US will maintain a capability to accomplish its GW objectives regardless of the conditions under which hostilities are initiated.

[Makes a difference what GW objectives are; destroy US ability to wage war, or to continue war.]

During the initial operations, the US will minimize loss and damage to the US and its Allies and will inflict in turn, maximum loss and damage on the enemy in order to either (a) bring about his capitulation, or (b) provide a residual margin of advantage to the US and its Allies.

[no longer: "sufficient to ensure victory"] The governing principle in the employment of nuclear weapons is that the US must emerge from the exchange [no longer: the initial exchange] with the greatest possible over-all advantage.

[The soon coming survivability of control and of weapons and selectivity creates possibilities for strategy not previously feasible: e.g. threats based on withheld forces]

[There may, in some cases, be competition with strategies directly attacking capabilities, ignoring effects on "will" or "intention"; but in other cases, such strategies

[To influence wartime opinion, Pres. must: (1) influence the set of contingency plans available, postural flexibility, warning-and-info system; (2) develop and publicize liaison plan; (3) remain inflexible at

most times when major institution of uncommitted civilian influences behavior.

Strat. Consider:

Objective of US and allies is to promote the overall strength and unity of the Free World and to deterr the S-S Bloc from the use of armed force.

[And to limit or improve the consequences of the US of an SC use of armed force. And to make unintended use less likely, all less destabilizing.]

convince allies that US strategy & policy serve their security interests

[And convince SC that not attacking US will serve its security interests; reduce chance of accidents, US false alarm, SC false alarm — e.g. based on US alerting procedures]

Riskless

GW (not defined):

US forces may be required to take the initiative, if so directed by the President, for example, in response to knowledge that a Soviet attack against the US is imminent or to honor a security treaty commitment. [Not in SNSP] However, US national policy precludes the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war.

[Pres. should have a variety of actions available to respond to knowledge that an enemy attack is imminent or that a major nuclear assault is underway. These should include plans for a US initiative attack: designed to exploit circumstances in terms of US objectives. Also, possibility for silent, attrition.]

[Discourage SO from thinking pre-emptive strike preferable; reduce chance of "false alarm", SO fear of "false alarm", US unauthorized action; and adventure of pre-emptive attack (US initiative might avoid SO cities; US initiation much less likely to).
Moritz?]

[AF claims: Delete "so will". "Military objective is to destroy enemy capability to wage war. [NO! Since when? Not on will, mainly through effect on capability; to carry war part point where enemy has lost his will to resist — further to destroy his capability — may compromise other US objectives.] "The destruction of his will is in the political and psychological fields and goes beyond the military strategy required to win a war." [AO; "winning" often impossible unless strategy designed to affect enemy will] (Not built)]

[Cannot hope, under all circumstances, to achieve US objectives by destroying enemy capability to inflict damage. The fact that "attempt" has failed does not mean that no further failures are possible.]

[Moritz?: Instead of: "War...
Say: "Authorised? command will be ~~used~~ weapons
when required in defence of their command."
Instead of: "War, designated command will be performed..."

Initial mitigation plan deleted

Exploitation forces

will and ability to continue the war against the US and
its Allies. [not like Suez: to wage war]

- a) Defending the US and other vital areas.
- b) Preserving and retaining as many of its Allies as possible.
- c) Achieving a residual power relationship with other nations sufficient to survive as a free nation and pursue US national objectives.
- d) Concluding ~~objection~~ hostilities with a military position favorable to the success of the US + Allied post-war objectives.

[NOTE: all of this is consistent with an interpretation of GW as war with USSR, in which both US and USSR had limited objectives; war ends without total defeat & survival of SO — though this is not what AF had in mind.]

CW: Nuclear weapons will be used in CW when authorized by the President. Nuclear ops will be planned against targets that contribute directly to the enemy military effort in the area of hostilities and against other targets that constitute an immediate threat to friendly forces in that area. Situations may occur in which authorization for the use of nuclear weapons will be delayed. There will be other contingencies which do not warrant the use

GW: Military objective of the US for general war, a war
until the USSR, [not a USOP: disagreement over role of China
in 1965], is to defeat the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

This includes:

- 1) Reducing by military action the capabilities of the USSR and Comm. China to the point where they have lost their will and ability to continue the war against the US and its Allies. [not like USOP: to wage war]
- 2) Defending the US and other vital areas.
- 3) Preserving and retrieving as many of its Allies as possible.
- 4) Achieving a residual power relationship with other nations sufficient to survive as a free nation and pursue US national objectives.
- 5) Concluding ~~objection~~ hostilities with a military position favorable to the success of the US + Allied post-war objectives.

[Note: all of this is consistent with an interpretation of GW as war with USSR, in which both US and USSR had limited objectives; war ends without total defeat & surrender of SO — though this is not what AF had in mind.]

CW: Nuclear weapons will be used in CW when authorized by the President. Nuclear ops will be planned against targets that contribute directly to the enemy military effort in the area of hostilities and against other threats that constitute

strategic nature:

policies of the US will focus

of military objectives, strategy concepts and tactics which are in
consonance with actual US military capabilities.

Constitute a directive to commanders of the unified services
comms. for the conduct of ops in cold, limited and general war.

[Abandon this trichotomy]

Provide strategic & logistic planning guidance ...

To Military Services for disposition, employment & support
of US military forces in the conduct of ops, and

[Since OP related to actual current capabilities, curious that
OP is identical for 1965.]

[How would actual capabilities permit US to achieve objectives?

... Then, how important to change capabilities: e.g. C&C capo?]

→ Def. of S-S Bloc (includes "such other countries as may be
determined to be dominated by International Communism.")

[i.e. Who is the enemy in GW? Not in BNSP or OP.]

GW: like OP; but without phrase "coincident with the
foregoing"

GW: like OP (unlike BNSP): "to continue the war."

of military objectives, strategy concepts and ways which are in consonance with actual US military capabilities.

Constitute a directive to commanders of the unified & spec
comms. for the conduct of ops in cold, limited and general.
[Elaborate this terminology]

Provide strategic & operational planning guidance.

To military forces for disposition, employment & support
of US military forces in the conduct of ops, and

[Since correlated to actual current capabilities, curious that
OP is identical for 1965.]

[Now will do actual capabilities limit US to active objective.
Hence, how important to change capabilities e.g. C&C cap.

→ Def. of S-S Bloc (includes "such other countries as may be
determined to be dominated by International Communism".)

[i.e. who is the enemy in GW? Not in BNSP or OP]

GW: like OP, but without phrase "consistent with the
foregoing"

GW: like OP (unlike BNSP): "to continue the war"

of military options. Plans will be formulated accordingly.

The JCS will, at the time of authorization, provide additional guidance, as required, for the use of nuclear weapons.

Gov's US national policy prescribes preventive war. CW, though not considered likely, might result from hostilities short of CW which were not initially intended by either side to lead to CW [i.e. war with USSR?], or might be initiated by the Soviets with little or no warning. In response to knowledge that a Soviet attack against the US is imminent or to honor a security treaty commitment, the US forces may be required to take the initiative, if so directed by the President.

Offensive opportunities created by the initial exchange will be exploited. Offensive + defensive employment of joint and combined military forces, and recovery and reconstitution of forces and the logistics base will be considered to exploit the strategic advantage gained by the nuclear strike and to minimize any gains which may have been made by the Soviets. No attempt is made to preindicate the length of a nuclear war.

"Any" may wait to expand the "exploitation" phase

[Any?]

The US, under conditions of general war, will launch [not "probably"] an initial nuclear strategy attack against optimum-war target system (the NSC), as an essential task to be accomplished under the general conditions in which hostilities may be initiated.

[Tasks now included in NSP also]

M-M+G expansion: during limited war or prior to a GW.

- a) Plans will stipulate that nuclear weapons will be used as [when?] authorized by the Pres.
- b) CW plans should include appropriate provisions for partial implementation [No numbers?] in the event such action becomes necessary --
- c) War plans will be executed when directed by the JCS. [Pres?] authorizing messages will specifically designate those nations against which operations are to be conducted.

L

~~Deterrence is a bet~~

Finite deterrence is a bet — a bet that deterrence won't fail.
Thought of as reducing chance of failure to zero. But if it does
fail, everything is lost. Ancillary benefits.

US should employ its strategic capabilities as... a means of
protecting rather than destroying the nation's vital interests
in the event that deterrence should fail.

[Is this a policy that guarantees that deterrence will not
fail and that other US interests will be secure? If so, take it.]

Though O-T destroys war-supporting Powers, so might figures that
sizeable residual of force would enable them to take over
industry + econ. of neighboring countries to re-establish it.

(Macmillan's ~~tin~~ men; iron, Gold + Steel.)

Might predict eventual victory. Hence, deterrent effect of regular
forces not sufficient. (Although "would take S-S & Co...
unless they estimated that no other course of action would
permit ~~this~~ attainment of their objectives.)

[Also, blackmail]

Also, couldn't be depended on to prevent SS forces from
inflicting unacceptable damage to us. [Can O-14?]

if their survival or continued progress were threatened and
if their military residual would permit them to prevail in
spite of devastation of SS industry + economy. [Mac...]